How do local politics shape national political competition in Africa? This essay explores opposition party formation in Nigeria, where citizens recently voted out the People's Democratic Party (PDP) after 16 years. But rather than analysing the 2015 election cross-sectionally or in terms of aggregate indicators of performance such as the level of violence or the rate of Gross Domestic Product growth, I focus on local politics. Drawing upon field research and election observation in Rivers, a key opposition state, I show how subnational governments, including one particular local government, leveraged legal authority and economic development to challenge the federal government. Nigeria's federalism has historically served as a mechanism for resource distribution and ethno-political representation. It has been undermined by military rule, centralised oil revenues, and violent regional insurgencies. Despite constitutional barriers, judicial ambiguity, and retaliation from the PDP, I argue that federalism provided the opposition All Progressives Congress a partisan basis for interest coordination, and in Rivers specifically it gave local frustrations a national profile that helped undermine PDP at the polls.
NIGERIA IS TYPICALLY CONSIDERED A CASE OF TROUBLED FEDERALISM due to military rule, oil rents, colonial legacies, and recurring sectarian movements -many of them violent. However this portrait of failed fiscal federalism and frustrated representation has been changing since a 1999 transition to civilian rule. As opposition parties established regionalized centres of power, federalism facilitated coordination across states and as this article emphasises, challenges from the bottom up. I show how this suggests an explanation for Muhammadu Buhari's 2015 electoral victory that differs from existing analyses emphasising cross-sectional trends.
1 I argue that rather than making governors weak and dependent on the centre, as standard expectations of fiscal federalism suggest, statutorily guaranteed grants to states increased governors' power because they provided relatively stable income streams. As the ruling party attempted to destabilise these revenue streams, opposition states insured themselves against federal encroachment by pursuing regionalized economic development, and in several cases they even increased tax collection in I first summarize research on subnational regimes. I also describe a research revival on decentralisation that promises to provide a missing link between local politics and political competition in Africa. I justify the focus on Nigeria by noting its lessons for Africa's new oil exporters, the low opinion of its local governments, and variation in subnational government performance. I briefly introduce Nigeria and its federal system, before turning to a detailed study of Rivers State -a focal point for opposition in the 2015 elections and one of the most important oil producing states. Through an analysis at three institutional levels -federal, state and local -I describe a 'reciprocal retaliation' game in which the governor uses his constitutional powers over local governments to advance his party's interests. At the same time, the centre uses bureaucratic and political means to retaliate against the state, creating alliances embedded in local governments as tools of subnational subversion. Linking local and state politics to national political shifts provides a microanalytic perspective on party competition leading up to the 2015 defeat of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) at the national polls, and it more broadly advances a dialogue between emerging party research and comparative federalism.
Literature Review
Several recent literatures help shed light on the Rivers State rivalries and amplify its broader comparative importance. The large literature on democratisation has recently spun off research on subnational regimes, whereby states and provinces may be more -or less -democratic than the national government overall. This literature has paid little attention to African cases. There has also been a significant revival of interest on decentralization, much of it revising earlier optimism and starting to draw attention to party systems and other linkages between national institutions and local politics. Finally, a new line of research on African political parties is emerging. But by focusing on historical and macro-level questions, this promising literature 2 competitiveness and coherence of the party system appears to impact the extent of decentralisation. 7 The expansion of decentralisation in Africa in general, often accompanied by constitutional changes bolstering subnational power, suggests that more countries are moving towards federalism.
Case Study and Research Design
Nigeria is a critical case for advancing our understanding of subnational institutional development, and for exploring linkages among democratisation, federalism and party systems suggested by the literature. For starters, the 2015 defeat of Goodluck Jonathan and the PDP in the presidential, national legislative and nearly two thirds of the gubernatorial polls marked the first time since the 1999 transition to civilian rule that an incumbent political party was defeated at the polls. The PDP at the time was the largest political party in Africa, which had clung to power through disingenuous and sometimes brutal means, but more generally, party turnover is empirically associated with democratic consolidation. 8 The study usefully sheds light on party federalism has emerged as a tool for opposition party coordination and highly local politics serves as an organising metaphor for the national government's encroachment.
The Rivers State Rebellions
The sheer size of Nigeria's federal system -160 million people in 36 states whose governors The state police commissioner for a second time displayed a political bias when in a dramatic confrontation the police refused to let the caretaker committee enter the LGA offices.
The Niger Delta Civil Society Coalition called the police blockade 'a barbarous setback for democratic ideals' and an appeal to 'gangsterism'. 37 In May a federal high court in Port Harcourt to take over the powers of the Rivers State Assembly, which is in its constitutional powers, those seeking to impeach Amaechi went to court to re-open the Assembly. They won but the police didn't back off -they instead tried to allow the five insurgents in so they could convene the Assembly without Amaechi's allies, leading to a physical struggle over the parliamentary mace.
'We cannot access the complex because the federal government has assigned the police to take over the place', complained the Deputy Speaker. 40 As a statement from leading intellectuals 38 Obio/Akpor struggle rippled outwards and upwards, and the PDP fought back.
The Courts as Meditators of Federalism
The courts entered the dispute among federal, state and local politicians in several ways that 'unconstitutional, wrongful, null and void', along with the State Assembly's motion. It further ordered an injunction against anyone attempting to interfere. 44 Nsirim remained in the local government offices, but Governor Amaechi and the Assembly refused to recognize his authority.
'Each state law determines what a governor can do', says Amaechi, arguing that Obio/Akpor was merely a suspension. 'In Rivers, the State gives you authority to remove, suspend, or dissolve a council'. 45 The Deputy Speaker of the state Assembly agrees. 46 Again, the court cases present a morass but the federal court's earlier decision would typically surpass a state court order. IHRHL agrees the law clearly says local government councils are answerable to the state Assembly but says that appointing a caretaker council 'at the speed of light' seemed to deny the chair due process, and removal en mass was dubious, especially when the chair's removal did not trigger the law's chain of succession for his replacement.
47
A few weeks after Nsirim's case, the courts weighed in on the stalemate at the state House of Assembly. A Rivers State High Court ruled that Evans Bipi (the First Lady's ally) had no authority to assume the Assembly's speakership. 48 But the 27 members loyal to Governor
Amaechi remained physically barred from the State House, and continued to meet in an old office building nearby. So while the Assembly was subject to all kinds of encroachments on its autonomy -from the police, the national party leadership, from 'godfathers' (discussed below), and from the governor for that matter -the judicature kept its distance. This is consistent with a string of court decisions dating back to Nigeria's Second Republic (1979 Republic ( -1983 
An Opposition Emerges as Incumbents Escalate
The APC survived the legal battles, generating stability and coherence among the opposition. By offering a viable alternative to the PDP, it has lowered the risks of defection for disgruntled PDP members frustrated by the party's efforts to control candidate selection through national leadership or godfathers. 'With the emergence of the APC there is an alternative and PDP is beginning to wake up to that' says Rivers' deputy speaker. 56 'I was a strong and important member of PDP' says Governor Amaechi, but suspensions drove him and others out of the party. 57 The PDP then appears to have escalated with the ultimate weapon: fiscal federalism. By further providing a viable alternative for potential defectors, it gave politicians a new rationale for cultivating a national reputation -not necessarily to seek higher office but because identification with the APC also provided protection against the PDP. Courts issued conflicting decisions that failed to resolve ongoing constitutional questions about freedom of association and party formation, suggesting that basic issues about internal party governance will remain areas of contestation (and ripe for future research). If the APC's retaliation paid off at the national level in 2015, as it was swept in to the presidency, the National Assembly, and 22 out of 36 governorships it arguably backfired at home: Wike won the governorship, though there were significant problems with the election. 61 While the PDP's loss of the presidency is one, critical test of Nigeria's democratic development, it will also be important to see if the reciprocal retaliation game is over: Wike won the Rivers governorship and he may very well adopts his old adversary's tactics.REFERENCES 
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